Difference between revisions of "2019 Surveillance Camera Policy Vote"

Latest revision as of 02:20, 18 December 2019

History

Announced: TBD
Language locked: TBD
Voted on: TBD

Background

This vote changes the Membership Agreement regarding placement of surveillance cameras. At present, the board has the authority to place surveillance cameras anywhere to monitor public areas. To date, cameras have only been installed to monitor the building's entrances and exits and the server room. However, some public areas are more sensitive than others, e.g. areas in the facility where members commonly work or socialize. This vote requires a higher standard to place, move, or remove such cameras.

Research contained in the 2019 Anti-Theft Budget Vote called into question the effectiveness of cameras in preventing or investigating small tool theft. This vote was originally intended as a companion to that vote; it would remove the board's power to install cameras in sensitive public areas with the intention of diverting attention towards solutions that are more effective. Following discussion, other use cases of cameras were identified, including investigating tool misuse and investigating member disputes.

Any installation of a surveillance camera requires a careful consideration of the risks it presents vs. the benefit it offers.

While the Membership Agreement places strict controls on access to surveillance camera footage, one cannot entirely discount the possibility that such footage could be misused by an authorized individual, or disclosed via a security compromise. Areas such as the exterior doors likely have little value to a bad actor. However, cameras monitoring the interior of the building, where members work and socialize, has more potential for misuse. For example, such unauthorized access could be used to facilitate a bad actor stalking other members or compromising intellectual property.

Benefit needs to be considered carefully. Cameras are limited by line of sight and resolution. Further, effort is necessary to retrieve and review footage. Such effort may be significant if the time window of the incident being investigated is large. At present, footage must be reviewed manually by trusted volunteers, so the value to the organization of the investigation should exceed the value of the volunteer effort to review the footage.

This risk/benefit evaluation is difficult. This vote changes the voting process regarding security camera installation, movement, or removal, depending on several factors:

Building entrances and exits are already monitored. The loss of privacy to the membership here is small, as is the risk for misuse. AT the same time, these cameras may deter theft of larger tools. Entrances and exits, the exterior of the building (e.g. the alley), and infrastructure used by the camera system all pose the least risk to the membership, so the board has the power to place, move, and remove such cameras.

Other interior building spaces, such as where members work or socialize, are much more sensitive. Consent of both the board and the membership, determined by both a board vote and a member vote, is necessary to place, move, and remove such cameras. This prevents the board from placing such cameras over the objection of the majority of the membership, and it requires the board to make a case to the membership regarding why each new camera is necessary.

An exception exists for cameras required by contract, law, regulation, or insurance. For example, a new lease or a new insurance policy may require cameras monitoring the workshops. If such an event happened, then the directors, by vote, would have full authority regarding their installation, movement, and removal.

Language

The “Surveillance Cameras” section of the Membership Agreement shall be changed from:

PS:One reserves the right to place surveillance cameras within the facility where necessary and appropriate to monitor certain public areas by a vote of the directors.
Surveillance cameras shall be clearly denoted.
All camera locations shall be publicly documented.
Only the Board of Directors, DRC, or designated agents may have access to security footage on an as-needed case-by-case basis. Any instance of accessing camera footage shall be recorded in the following member meeting’s minutes and shall include the reason and individual accessing the footage. In DRC matters, where providing a public reason would conflict with confidentiality, surveillance footage access should be recorded in the process notes of the DRC for that raised issue.
All camera footage will be kept for a maximum of 6 months, unless part of an ongoing or archive of DRC or Board proceedings.
Members may not install recording devices or cameras in the facility without a vote of the membership or vote of the directors.

to:

PS:One reserves the right to place surveillance cameras within and external to the facility where necessary and appropriate to monitor certain public areas, as follows:
1. Cameras intended to record the building's entrances and exits, the exterior of the building and adjacent land, and infrastructure such as servers and network switches used by the surveillance camera system, may be placed, moved, or removed by an affirmative vote of the directors. Such cameras shall be placed, to the greatest extent practical, so that they avoid recording areas where members commonly work or socialize in the facility.
2. Cameras intended to record areas required by contract, law, regulation, or insurance may be placed, moved, or removed by an affirmative vote of the directors.
3. Cameras otherwise may be placed, moved, or removed by both an affirmative vote of the directors and an affirmative vote of the members. Following an affirmative vote of the directors, one or more directors shall sponsor the member vote. The member vote shall clearly describe the proposed location of the camera(s) and the area(s) to be recorded. The member vote shall also contain in its background information a justification for the placement, move, or removal.
Surveillance cameras shall be clearly denoted.
All camera locations shall be publicly documented.
Only the Board of Directors, DRC, or designated agents may have access to security footage on an as-needed case-by-case basis. Any instance of accessing camera footage shall be recorded in the following member meeting’s minutes and shall include the reason and individual accessing the footage. In DRC matters, where providing a public reason would conflict with confidentiality, surveillance footage access should be recorded in the process notes of the DRC for that raised issue.
All camera footage will be kept for a maximum of 6 months, unless part of an ongoing or archive of DRC or Board proceedings.
Members may not install recording devices or cameras in the facility without a vote of the membership or vote of the directors.

Results

Quorum: TBD Present: TBD

For: TBD Against: TBD Abstain: TBD

@@ Line 11: / Line 11: @@
 == Background ==
-=== Overview ===
+This vote changes the Membership Agreement regarding placement of surveillance cameras. At present, the board has the authority to place surveillance cameras anywhere to monitor public areas. To date, cameras have only been installed to monitor the building's entrances and exits and the server room. However, some public areas are more sensitive than others, e.g. areas in the facility where members commonly work or socialize. This vote requires a higher standard to place, move, or remove such cameras.
-'''NOTE: This vote is Part 1 of 2. The other vote is [[2019 Anti-Theft Budget Vote|here]]. At the request of some members, the two solutions presented have been split into two distinct votes. The sponsor is proposing both votes as part of a comprehensive solution to the problem of tool theft and suggests that both votes be enacted.'''
-As Pumping Station: One has expanded, it has experienced an increase in tool theft. Surveillance cameras, first installed in 2015 to monitor the building entrances and exits, have limited use in preventing many thefts. A January 2019 revision to the Membership Agreement permitted expansion of cameras if approved by the Board, paving the way for recording members working inside the space (“Membership Agreement,” 2019).  In response to theft, proposals on the organization’s e-mail list have ranged from expanding camera usage to instituting criminal background checks. This vote uses an evidence-based approach to reduce tool theft by taking the following actions:
+Research contained in the [[2019 Anti-Theft Budget Vote]] called into question the effectiveness of cameras in preventing or investigating small tool theft. This vote was originally intended as a companion to that vote; it would remove the board's power to install cameras in sensitive public areas with the intention of diverting attention towards solutions that are more effective. Following discussion, other use cases of cameras were identified, including investigating tool misuse and investigating member disputes.
-* Updating the surveillance camera policy to prohibit cameras from monitoring internal workspaces. More cameras will only waste time and money, will create privacy issues, and will only serve to distract the organization from implementing real solutions. '''This is part of this vote.'''
+Any installation of a surveillance camera requires a careful consideration of the risks it presents vs. the benefit it offers.
-* Budgeting $1000 to allow a team of members to prototype and experiment with anti-theft solutions. '''This is the [[2019 Anti-Theft Budget Vote]].'''
-'''NOTE: The rest of the text, with the exception of the vote Language, is identical between the two votes.'''
+While the Membership Agreement places strict controls on access to surveillance camera footage, one cannot entirely discount the possibility that such footage could be misused by an authorized individual, or disclosed via a security compromise. Areas such as the exterior doors likely have little value to a bad actor. However, cameras monitoring the interior of the building, where members work and socialize, has more potential for misuse. For example, such unauthorized access could be used to facilitate a bad actor stalking other members or compromising intellectual property.
-=== More cameras won’t solve the problem ===
+Benefit needs to be considered carefully. Cameras are limited by line of sight and resolution. Further, effort is necessary to retrieve and review footage. Such effort may be significant if the time window of the incident being investigated is large. At present, footage must be reviewed manually by trusted volunteers, so the value to the organization of the investigation should exceed the value of the volunteer effort to review the footage.
-In the past two months, Ryan Pierce conducted an analysis of surveillance camera issues in makerspaces. His primary research consisted of five interviews of PS:One members who hold positions leadership at PS:One and other makerspaces. He also explored surveillance camera practices and policies at other makerspaces.
+This risk/benefit evaluation is difficult. This vote changes the voting process regarding security camera installation, movement, or removal, depending on several factors:
-Pierce (2019) concluded that surveillance cameras monitoring PS:One’s entrances may have contributed to preventing the theft of large, expensive tools. However, none of his interview subjects could recall any instance where analysis of security camera footage was useful in investigating the theft of smaller tools, such as the angle grinders that vanished from the Hot Metals area. These tools could easily fit in a backpack. Further, Sky Nova, who is responsible for managing the surveillance camera system, needed to deny a request to review camera footage because the time window was too long. Frequently, thefts at PS:One are not promptly noticed, and one cannot expect volunteers to scrutinize weeks of footage from multiple cameras. Small items and large time windows render surveillance cameras useless.
+* Building entrances and exits are already monitored. The loss of privacy to the membership here is small, as is the risk for misuse. AT the same time, these cameras may deter theft of larger tools. Entrances and exits, the exterior of the building (e.g. the alley), and infrastructure used by the camera system all pose the least risk to the membership, so the board has the power to place, move, and remove such cameras.
-Retail stores rely heavily on saturating their sales floors with cameras for loss prevention. In an article concerning retail theft, Colapinto (2008) describes a Manhattan department store with hundreds of cameras, each controlled by a joystick, operated from a command center with twenty screens monitored by three staff members. This approach could never work at PS:One. While more cameras may increase the likelihood of capturing video of a theft, it also increases the amount of video review needed, and PS:One does not have the volunteers needed to find the needle in the haystack.
+* Other interior building spaces, such as where members work or socialize, are much more sensitive. Consent of both the board and the membership, determined by both a board vote and a member vote, is necessary to place, move, and remove such cameras. This prevents the board from placing such cameras over the objection of the majority of the membership, and it requires the board to make a case to the membership regarding why each new camera is necessary.
-Pierce (2019) also reported that while no interview subject objected to PS:One’s monitoring of the entrances, some expressed concerns about privacy that would be exacerbated by cameras installed to record interior spaces. At present, the Board has authorized an additional internal camera to record in Hot Metals, which has not yet been installed. One interview subject disagreed with the decision to record in Hot Metals.
+* An exception exists for cameras required by contract, law, regulation, or insurance. For example, a new lease or a new insurance policy may require cameras monitoring the workshops. If such an event happened, then the directors, by vote, would have full authority regarding their installation, movement, and removal.
-This vote explicitly limits cameras to those focused on the building’s external entrances and exits, the building’s exterior, and network, server, and camera infrastructure. Additional language was added to permit mounting cameras on the outside of the building, should this be necessary. Recording networking and computing infrastructure is necessary to capture attempts to disable the camera system; these areas do not overlap with member work areas so should not present a privacy risk. These changes preserve privacy while eliminating collection of data that PS:One cannot reasonably analyze with volunteer labor. This enables the organization to focus on real solutions while avoiding the temptation to throw more cameras at the problem.
-=== Background checks are deeply problematic ===
-One solution proposed on the mailing list was to screen current and future members via a criminal background check. Ignoring the significant cost and labor to administer this, such an approach harbors intrinsic racial bias, would likely decrease PS:One’s diversity, and probably would do nothing to reduce tool theft.
-Colapinto (2008) notes that actress Winona Ryder shoplifted from Saks Fifth Avenue, and that one of President George H. W. Bush’s top advisers fraudulently returned purchases at a Target store. Anyone can steal. Assuming that only convicted felons are responsible for stolen angle grinders and cordless drills, and revoking memberships based on past felony convictions in the interest of protecting tools, has no basis in fact.
-Felony convictions carry heavy racial bias. Research by Bonczar and Beck (1997) projects that 28.5% of Black males and 16.0% of Hispanic males are likely to be incarcerated, compared with 4.4% of White males. Goldman, Cooper, and Kugler (2018) demonstrate through experiments that Whites, when evaluating fictional job applications for a position, are more likely to rank a Black candidate with a non-violent felony drug conviction lower than an identically qualified White candidate with an identical felony conviction. These results become even more concerning when viewed in the context of PS:One’s demographics. A recent member survey showed that 82.4% of PS:One members identify as White while only 2.6% identify as African American, and recent cohorts are more White than older cohorts, implying that the space is becoming more White with time (Stein & Ciardi, 2018). Any process to screen members based on criminal background checks would be fraught with racial bias, given both the substantially higher rate of Black felony convictions and the tendency to forgive Whites for felonies that would be disqualifying for Blacks. This would only serve to make PS:One more White. Given this level of racial bias and PS:One’s already problematic demographics, screening members based on criminal background checks is unconscionable.
-=== Analysis of crime prevention strategies ===
-Simmons (2018) describes a problem similar to PS:One’s thefts. In a university library, 12 unattended patron-owned laptops were stolen in an academic year. Tools and laptops are both small, easily concealed, valuable property. An analysis of the problem using Routine Activity Theory and Rational Choice Theory yielded several solutions that the library implemented. The following year, no laptops were reported stolen.
-Routine Activity Theory asserts that crime exists within the context of normal, legal activities, it requires “a motivated offender, an attractive target, and the lack of a capable guardian”, and eliminating any one of these three factors prevents the crime (Cohen & Felson; Cullen et al. as cited by Simmons, 2018). Eck expands on this concept with the Crime Triangle consisting of “two nested triangles … [where] the inner triangle consists of three elements of a crime – the setting or place, the offender, and the target. The outer triangle represents three elements of supervision that a motivated offender must circumvent for a crime to occur – a place manager, a handler, and a guardian” (as cited by Simmons, 2018).
-Preventing theft by changing the inner triangle frequently is not feasible. PS:One cannot close its space, ban all members, or remove all tools. Since a crime cannot occur unless all three of the outer triangle controls are defeated, this area deserves examination. Having a handler supervise each member individually is not feasible. A place manager may take many forms, such as staff members and security guards, which is infeasible for PS:One, or a device, such as a surveillance camera. Indeed, Simmons (2018) mentions use of cameras in this capacity, however they proved too expensive for the library, which still eliminated laptop theft without relying upon them. As indicated above, surveillance cameras will not work at PS:One. This leaves the guardian, e.g. controls that can be placed on the property itself.
-Rational Choice Theory asserts that offenders use a rational decision-making process, based around a cost/benefit assessment, when deciding to commit a crime (Clarke & Cornish; Cullen et al.; Matsueda, Kreager, & Huizinga as cited by Simmons, 2018). This forms the basis for Situational Crime Prevention, which suggests five approaches: “increase the offender's required effort, increase the offender's risk, reduce the reward gained from the criminal activity, reduce the provocation or motivation to commit the crime, and remove any offender excuses (Clarke & Eck; Cornish & Clarke as cited by Simmons, 2018). Simmons (2018) noted the utilization of these approaches in the successful library anti-theft campaign.
-PS:One already employs some of these strategies. Security cameras focused on exits have increased offender risk of stealing large, expensive, tools that would quickly be noted as missing. Some area hosts have reduced the reward for theft by defacing the space’s tools with garish paint and obvious PS:One logos. Anti-theft solutions are an excellent addition that could increase an offender’s effort and risk.
-=== Anti-theft solutions ===
-This vote allocates $1000 to research and prototype anti-theft solutions. To date, PS:One has never funded a “research and development” vote, but this is very appropriate model when the solution(s) are not known up front. This amount should be adequate to explore one or more approaches in a limited capacity, but it is still small enough relative to PS:One’s budget that the organization can afford to risk it to research new technologies that may not work. It need not be a complete solution, e.g. only a few tools and one exit door might be monitored initially. Ideally, this research will lead to a workable design of one or more solutions, and costs to implement a full solution will become known. Funding for this can come from a new member vote. While this vote does not dictate or prescribe any solutions to examine, two ideas are presented here for reference as possibilities:
-* Electronic Article Surveillance – This technology, according to Colapinto (2008), is used in retail stores to sound an alarm when unpaid merchandise leaves the store. A similar concept, such as a longer range equivalent of an RFID tag fitted on vulnerable tools, combined with an antenna system near each exterior door, can track when the tool is in proximity of the door. It could register a silent alarm signal that would log the identity of the tool, the antenna location, and a timestamp. A volunteer could verify the tool is missing and then review the exterior surveillance camera footage from that door at that time. The volunteer need only examine footage for a small time window. Even if the tool were concealed in a backpack, it would still trigger the alarm. This greatly increases the offender’s risk. Should it become known that tool thieves have been caught, that reduces the future provocation to steal.
-* Tool Checkout – Tools could be stored in individually locked cages or boxes, or they could be tethered to something immovable. PS:One members now have RFID keyfobs, used for building entry. This fob could be used to check out a tool, freeing it from its cage, box, or tether. The identity of the user and the tool, as well as the date and time, would be logged. If the user fails to check in the tool, and the tool is missing from the space, the user could be held accountable. This increases offender effort and risk to steal a tool, as well as decreases provocation by having fewer small, unattended, valuable tools. This also could protect against unauthorized tool use by requiring that the user appear in a database of authorized users before permitting the user to check out the tool.
-Arguments against these systems include cost and implementation complexity. Certainly, cost exceeds that of an angle grinder. However, small thefts add up over time, and such a system could easily pay for itself. Doing nothing, or installing more cameras that do not catch any theft, can make matters worse; past successful thefts provide provocation for future thefts by encourage copycats and decreasing the offender’s perceived risk. Also, based on a conversation with a member, solutions like these have been considered before, and should funds become available, some members would be interested in prototyping solutions.
-=== Conclusion ===
-Together, eliminating internal camera surveillance and funding research for anti-theft solutions will provide the best likelihood of reducing tool theft at PS:One. The existing cameras focused on external doors can deter theft of large, expensive tools. However, for smaller, less expensive tools, cameras are ineffective at deterring theft and will only distract the organization from solving the theft problem. Further, cameras recording internal workspaces intrude upon member privacy. Technical solutions, such as recording an alarm when a tool leaves an exterior door or requiring RFID key fobs to check out and return commonly stolen tools, should increase effort and risk for an offender to steal tools, as well as reduce opportunities for theft. By combining these evidence-based approaches, this vote, if enacted, should reduce tool theft while preserving member privacy.
 == Language ==
@@ Line 80: / Line 42: @@
 to:
-# PS:One reserves the right to place surveillance cameras within '''and external to''' the facility where necessary and appropriate to monitor certain public areas by a vote of the directors''', provided that such cameras shall only record exterior entrances and exits, the exterior of the building and adjacent land, and infrastructure such as servers and network switches used by the surveillance camera system.'''
+# PS:One reserves the right to place surveillance cameras within''' and external to''' the facility where necessary and appropriate to monitor certain public areas''', as follows:'''
-# '''Surveillance camera placement shall, to the greatest extent practical, avoid recording of areas where members commonly work.'''
+## '''Cameras intended to record the building's entrances and exits, the exterior of the building and adjacent land, and infrastructure such as servers and network switches used by the surveillance camera system, may be placed, moved, or removed by an affirmative vote of the directors. Such cameras shall be placed, to the greatest extent practical, so that they avoid recording areas where members commonly work or socialize in the facility.'''
+## '''Cameras intended to record areas required by contract, law, regulation, or insurance may be placed, moved, or removed by an affirmative vote of the directors.'''
+## '''Cameras otherwise may be placed, moved, or removed by both an affirmative vote of the directors and an affirmative vote of the members. Following an affirmative vote of the directors, one or more directors shall sponsor the member vote. The member vote shall clearly describe the proposed location of the camera(s) and the area(s) to be recorded. The member vote shall also contain in its background information a justification for the placement, move, or removal.'''
 # Surveillance cameras shall be clearly denoted.
 # All camera locations shall be publicly documented.
@@ Line 96: / Line 60: @@
 Abstain: TBD
-== References ==
+[[Category:Votes]]
+[[Category:2019 Votes]]
-Bonczar, T.P. & Beck, A.J. (1997), “Bureau of justice statistics special report, lifetime likelihood of going to state or federal prison, NCJ-160092”. Retrieved from https://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/Llgsfp.pdf
-Colapinto, J. (2008). Stop, Thief! ''New Yorker, 84''(26), 74–83. Retrieved from https://search-ebscohost-com.ezproxy1.lib.asu.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=34042746&site=ehost-live
-Goldman, B., Cooper, D., & Kugler, T. (2019). Crime and punishment. ''International Journal of Conflict Management (Emerald), 30''(1), 2–23. https://doi-org.ezproxy1.lib.asu.edu/10.1108/IJCMA-04-2018-0055
-Membership agreement. (2019, January 24). Retrieved November 20, 2019, from Pumping Station: One Wiki: https://wiki.pumpingstationone.org/Membership_agreement
-Pierce, R. (2019) Makerspaces and Surveillance – 2019 meets 1984 (Unpublished paper). Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ.
-Simmons, H. (2018). A Framework for the Analysis and Management of Library Security Issues Applied to Patron-property Theft. ''Journal of Academic Librarianship, 44''(2), 279–286. https://doi-org.ezproxy1.lib.asu.edu/10.1016/j.acalib.2017.12.021
-Stein, A., & Ciardi, A. (2018, December 10). Results from PS1’s first-ever member survey. Retrieved from https://pumpingstationone.org/2018/12/results-from-ps1s-first-ever-member-survey/
-[[Category:Votes]][[Category:2019 Votes]]
+[[category:2019 votes open]]

Difference between revisions of "2019 Surveillance Camera Policy Vote"

Latest revision as of 02:20, 18 December 2019

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