Changes

Colapinto (2008) notes that actress Winona Ryder shoplifted from Saks Fifth Avenue, and that one of President George H. W. Bush’s top advisers fraudulently returned purchases at a Target store. Anyone can steal. Assuming that only convicted felons are responsible for stolen angle grinders and cordless drills, and revoking memberships based on past felony convictions in the interest of protecting tools, has no basis in fact.

Colapinto (2008) notes that actress Winona Ryder shoplifted from Saks Fifth Avenue, and that one of President George H. W. Bush’s top advisers fraudulently returned purchases at a Target store. Anyone can steal. Assuming that only convicted felons are responsible for stolen angle grinders and cordless drills, and revoking memberships based on past felony convictions in the interest of protecting tools, has no basis in fact.

Felony convictions carry heavy racial bias. Research by Bonczar and Beck (1997) projects that 28.5% of Black males and 16.0% of Hispanic males are likely to be incarcerated, compared with 4.4% of White males. Goldman, Cooper, and Kugler (2018) demonstrate through experiments that Whites, when evaluating fictional job applications for a position, are more likely to rank a Black candidate with a non-violent felony drug conviction lower than a an identically qualified White candidate with an identical felony conviction. These results become even more concerning when viewed in the context of PS:One’s demographics. A recent member survey showed that 82.4% of PS:One members identify as White while only 2.6% identify as African American, and recent cohorts are more White than older cohorts, implying that the space is becoming more White with time (Stein & Ciardi, 2018). Any process to screen members based on criminal background checks would be fraught with racial bias, given both the substantially higher rate of Black felony convictions and the tendency to forgive Whites for felonies that would be disqualifying for Blacks. This would only serve to make PS:One more White. Given this level of racial bias and PS:One’s already problematic demographics, screening members based on criminal background checks is unconscionable.

Felony convictions carry heavy racial bias. Research by Bonczar and Beck (1997) projects that 28.5% of Black males and 16.0% of Hispanic males are likely to be incarcerated, compared with 4.4% of White males. Goldman, Cooper, and Kugler (2018) demonstrate through experiments that Whites, when evaluating fictional job applications for a position, are more likely to rank a Black candidate with a non-violent felony drug conviction lower than an identically qualified White candidate with an identical felony conviction. These results become even more concerning when viewed in the context of PS:One’s demographics. A recent member survey showed that 82.4% of PS:One members identify as White while only 2.6% identify as African American, and recent cohorts are more White than older cohorts, implying that the space is becoming more White with time (Stein & Ciardi, 2018). Any process to screen members based on criminal background checks would be fraught with racial bias, given both the substantially higher rate of Black felony convictions and the tendency to forgive Whites for felonies that would be disqualifying for Blacks. This would only serve to make PS:One more White. Given this level of racial bias and PS:One’s already problematic demographics, screening members based on criminal background checks is unconscionable.

=== Analysis of crime prevention strategies ===

=== Analysis of crime prevention strategies ===

=== Anti-theft solutions ===

=== Anti-theft solutions ===

This vote allocates $1000 to research and prototype anti-theft solutions. This amount should be adequate to explore one or more approaches in a limited capacity, but it is still small enough relative to PS:One’s budget that the organization can afford to risk it to research new technologies that may not work. It need not be a complete solution, e.g. only a few tools and one exit door might be monitored initially. Ideally, this research will lead to a workable design of one or more solutions, and costs to implement a full solution will become known. Funding for this can come from a new member vote. While this vote does not dictate or prescribe any solutions to examine, two ideas are presented here for reference as possibilites:

This vote allocates $1000 to research and prototype anti-theft solutions. To date, PS:One has never funded a “research and development” vote, but this is very appropriate model when the solution(s) are not known up front. This amount should be adequate to explore one or more approaches in a limited capacity, but it is still small enough relative to PS:One’s budget that the organization can afford to risk it to research new technologies that may not work. It need not be a complete solution, e.g. only a few tools and one exit door might be monitored initially. Ideally, this research will lead to a workable design of one or more solutions, and costs to implement a full solution will become known. Funding for this can come from a new member vote. While this vote does not dictate or prescribe any solutions to examine, two ideas are presented here for reference as possibilities:

Electronic Article Surveillance – This technology, according to Colapinto (2008), is used in retail stores to sound an alarm when unpaid merchandise leaves the store. A similar concept, such as a longer range equivalent of an RFID tag fitted on vulnerable tools, combined with an antenna system near each exterior door, can track when the tool is in proximity of the door. It could register a silent alarm signal that would log the identity of the tool, the antenna location, and a timestamp. A volunteer could verify the tool is missing and then review the exterior surveillance camera footage from that door at that time. The volunteer need only examine footage for a small time window. Even if the tool were concealed in a backpack, it would still trigger the alarm. This greatly increases the offender’s risk. Should it become known that tool thieves have been caught, that reduces the future provocation to steal.

* Electronic Article Surveillance – This technology, according to Colapinto (2008), is used in retail stores to sound an alarm when unpaid merchandise leaves the store. A similar concept, such as a longer range equivalent of an RFID tag fitted on vulnerable tools, combined with an antenna system near each exterior door, can track when the tool is in proximity of the door. It could register a silent alarm signal that would log the identity of the tool, the antenna location, and a timestamp. A volunteer could verify the tool is missing and then review the exterior surveillance camera footage from that door at that time. The volunteer need only examine footage for a small time window. Even if the tool were concealed in a backpack, it would still trigger the alarm. This greatly increases the offender’s risk. Should it become known that tool thieves have been caught, that reduces the future provocation to steal.

Tool Checkout – Tools could be stored in individually locked cages or boxes, or they could be tethered to something immovable. PS:One members now have RFID keyfobs, used for building entry. This fob could be used to check out a tool, freeing it from its cage, box, or tether. The identity of the user and the tool, as well as the date and time, would be logged. If the user fails to check in the tool, and the tool is missing from the space, the user could be held accountable. This increases offender effort and risk to steal a tool, as well as decreases provocation by having fewer small, unattended, valuable tools. This also could protect against unauthorized tool use by requiring that the user appear in a database of authorized users before permitting the user to check out the tool.

* Tool Checkout – Tools could be stored in individually locked cages or boxes, or they could be tethered to something immovable. PS:One members now have RFID keyfobs, used for building entry. This fob could be used to check out a tool, freeing it from its cage, box, or tether. The identity of the user and the tool, as well as the date and time, would be logged. If the user fails to check in the tool, and the tool is missing from the space, the user could be held accountable. This increases offender effort and risk to steal a tool, as well as decreases provocation by having fewer small, unattended, valuable tools. This also could protect against unauthorized tool use by requiring that the user appear in a database of authorized users before permitting the user to check out the tool.

Arguments against these systems include cost and implementation complexity. Certainly, cost exceeds that of an angle grinder. However, small thefts add up over time, and such a system could easily pay for itself. Doing nothing, or installing more cameras that do not catch any theft, can make matters worse; past successful thefts provide provocation for future thefts by encourage copycats and decreasing the offender’s perceived risk. Also, based on a conversation with a member, solutions like these have been considered before, and should funds become available, some members would be interested in prototyping solutions.

Arguments against these systems include cost and implementation complexity. Certainly, cost exceeds that of an angle grinder. However, small thefts add up over time, and such a system could easily pay for itself. Doing nothing, or installing more cameras that do not catch any theft, can make matters worse; past successful thefts provide provocation for future thefts by encourage copycats and decreasing the offender’s perceived risk. Also, based on a conversation with a member, solutions like these have been considered before, and should funds become available, some members would be interested in prototyping solutions.

Together, eliminating internal camera surveillance, which is ineffective and intrudes upon member privacy, and funding research for anti-theft solutions will provide the best likelihood of reducing tool theft at PS:One.

 

Together, eliminating internal camera surveillance and funding research for anti-theft solutions will provide the best likelihood of reducing tool theft at PS:One. The existing cameras focused on external doors can deter theft of large, expensive tools. However, for smaller, less expensive tools, cameras are ineffective at deterring theft and will only distract the organization from solving the theft problem. Further, cameras recording internal workspaces intrude upon member privacy. Technical solutions, such as recording an alarm when a tool leaves an exterior door or requiring RFID key fobs to check out and return commonly stolen tools, should increase effort and risk for an offender to steal tools, as well as reduce opportunities for theft. By combining these evidence-based approaches, this vote, if enacted, should reduce tool theft while preserving member privacy.

== Language ==

== Language ==

to:

to:

# PS:One reserves the right to place surveillance cameras within '''and on''' the facility where necessary and appropriate to monitor certain public areas by a vote of the directors.

# PS:One reserves the right to place surveillance cameras within '''and external to''' the facility where necessary and appropriate to monitor certain public areas by a vote of the directors''', provided that such cameras shall only record exterior entrances and exits, the exterior of the building and adjacent land, and infrastructure such as servers and network switches used by the surveillance camera system.'''

# '''Surveillance cameras shall only record exterior entrances and exits, the exterior of the building and adjacent land, and infrastructure such as servers and network switches used by the surveillance camera system. Surveillance camera placement shall, to the greatest extent practical, avoid recording of areas where members commonly work.'''

# '''Surveillance camera placement shall, to the greatest extent practical, avoid recording of areas where members commonly work.'''

# Surveillance cameras shall be clearly denoted.

# Surveillance cameras shall be clearly denoted.

# All camera locations shall be publicly documented.

# All camera locations shall be publicly documented.

== References ==

== References ==

Bonczar, T.P. and Beck, A.J. (1997), “Bureau of justice statistics special report, lifetime likelihood of going to state or federal prison, NCJ-160092”. Retrieved from https://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/Llgsfp.pdf

Bonczar, T.P. & Beck, A.J. (1997), “Bureau of justice statistics special report, lifetime likelihood of going to state or federal prison, NCJ-160092”. Retrieved from https://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/Llgsfp.pdf

Colapinto, J. (2008). Stop, Thief! ''New Yorker, 84''(26), 74–83. Retrieved from https://search-ebscohost-com.ezproxy1.lib.asu.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=34042746&site=ehost-live

Colapinto, J. (2008). Stop, Thief! ''New Yorker, 84''(26), 74–83. Retrieved from https://search-ebscohost-com.ezproxy1.lib.asu.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=34042746&site=ehost-live